Introduction
The recent decision in Reid-Roberts & Anor v Mei-Lin & Anor [2026] EWHC 49 (Ch) explored whether WhatsApp messages and emails could satisfy the statutory requirements for the disposal of a beneficial interest in land pursuant to the Law of Property Act 1925 (the “LPA25”). The High Court, on appeal, held that WhatsApp headers do not amount to a ‘signature’ for the specific purposes of the LPA25.
The Court noted, however, that WhatsApp messages can readily create binding contractual obligations between parties. This note explores the specifics of the decision and the wider commentary the Court gave about the formation of binding contractual obligations created by informal messages and electronic communications.
Background
The dispute involved the joint trustees (the “Trustees”) in bankruptcy of the Second Respondent, Mr Audun Mar Gudmundsson (“Mr Gudmundsson”), and Ms Hsiao Mei-Lin (“Ms Lin”), his former wife, who jointly owned the legal and beneficial interest in a residential property together (the “Property”).
At first instance, the Deputy Judge declared that the Trustees and Ms Lin each held 50% of the beneficial interest in the Property, and postponed the sale until 1 August 2032. On appeal, the Trustees argued that the Deputy Judge was wrong in finding “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of s. 335A(2) and (3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 in Ms Lin’s favour and, on that basis, in delaying the sale of the Property for eight years.
On cross-appeal, Ms Lin argued that the Deputy Judge erred in failing to find that Mr Gudmundsson had transferred his beneficial interest in the Property to her prior to his bankruptcy, as the beneficial interest had been transferred by virtue of a WhatsApp and email exchange in December 2018.
The appeal court was required to address two substantial issues. First, whether the WhatsApp and email exchanges in December 2018 complied with the requirements of s. 53(1)(a) and/or (c) of the LPA25. Secondly, whether the Deputy Judge was correct in exercising their discretion and finding “exceptional circumstances” so as to defer the sale of the Property until 1 August 2032.
The Findings on Appeal
Having found that Mr Gudmundsson had not, by the electronic correspondence, expressed an objective intention immediately to dispose of his interest in the Property, the Court did not strictly need to determine whether the WhatsApp messages and email exchange of December 2018 were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of s. 53(1) LPA25. However, the Court addressed the alternative scenario – that in which Mr Gudmundsson had expressed such an objective intention – and considered the Trustees’ argument that the WhatsApp messages did not satisfy the statutory requirements.
The Trustees contended that: (a) the WhatsApp messages could only be regarded as properly signed for the purposes of s. 53 LPA25 if the name of the sender appeared in the actual message in a manner similar to an email signature, (b) there must be an intention to connect the name of the sender with the contents of the writing so as to authenticate not simply the document, but the whole of it, and (c) a WhatsApp header is insufficient to demonstrate such intention.
The Court concluded that the header of the WhatsApp chat was analogous to the email address added automatically by a service provider, and was not part of the message itself but merely incidental to it. On that basis, the Court held that the WhatsApp message would not have satisfied the requirements of s. 53(1)(a) or (c) LPA25. The cross-appeal was dismissed.
On the issue concerning possession of the Property by Ms Lin for over eight years, the High Court accepted that exceptional circumstances affected those living at the Property, but considered that eight years amounted in substance to an indefinite suspension and was inconsistent with the interests of creditors. Vacant possession was therefore ordered for July 2027, rather than July 2032.
Comment
Although focused on the LPA25 and the requirements for severing a jointly owned beneficial interest in land, the Court’s reasoning concerning the requirements for a valid signature may be relevant to a broader range of statutory provisions – the Statute of Frauds 1677, s.2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, and s. 40 of the Law of Property Act 1925 being some examples.
The judgment indicates that electronic messages sent via WhatsApp may, in principle, be capable of transferring property, but underscores the importance of identifying an “authenticating intent” – that is, that the sender included his signature through a conscious decision.
A mere WhatsApp header containing the name or mobile telephone number of the sender is unlikely to be sufficient, nor is an automatically included email address, in the absence of further circumstances demonstrating that the sender was aware that their name was being applied so as to authenticate the contents of the communication.
Whilst Reid-Roberts confirms the strict requirements for compliance in matters concerning the LPA25, there are numerous cases where the courts have been well prepared to determine that binding contractual obligations have been created using WhatsApp and/or other informal electronic communication methods, such as in Jaevee Homes Ltd v Fincham [2025] EWHC 942 (TCC).
As a matter of practice, parties should approach any discussion(s) and negotiations, or variations of, agreements, carefully when conducted via informal electronic communications (or otherwise).
Practical steps to ensure certainty of legal relations should include explicitly labelling negotiations as “subject to contract”, as well as obtaining appropriate legal advice. If any assistance is required in relation to matters in this case update: Velitor’s team can assist and advise. Please contact Jonathan Child or Christopher Lillywhite for more information.