The High Court confirms bankruptcy orders cannot be used as a litigation tactic to prevent enforcement of court judgments

Case update: Stacks Living Limited & Ors v Balvinder Shergill & Anor [2025] EWHC 9 (Ch) and Stacks Living Limited & Ors v The Official Receiver (as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Balvinder Shergill) & Ors [2025] EWHC 2478 (Ch)

Summary

The liquidators of two companies successfully pursued claims against the director and sole shareholder of the companies, Mr Shergill, for fraudulent trading (s. 213 Insolvency Act 1986 (“IA”)), and against both Mr Shergill and another director of one of the companies, Miss Smith, for wrongful trading (s. 214 IA) and misfeasance. Having obtained judgment, the liquidator obtained an interim charging order over Mr Shergill’s property. However, Mr Shergill attempted to avoid enforcement of that order by promptly applying for his own bankruptcy (which was then granted). In a subsequent case, the ICC Judge exercised her discretion under section 346(6) IA, and reversed the bankruptcy order and permitted the conversion of the interim charging order into one that was final.

Background

The case concerns applications by the joint liquidators of two insolvent companies, Stacks Living Ltd (“Stacks”) and Staffs Furnishing Ltd (“Staffs”). Both companies were wound up in 2018 on petitions by Stafford Borough Council (the “Council”) for non-payment of tax in relation to premises they had occupied or used in Stafford. The companies were owned and controlled by Mr Shergill. Mr Shergill was also the sole director of both companies, except for the period from July to October 2018, when Miss Smith (Mr Shergill’s domestic partner) was the sole director of Staffs. During that period, Mr Shergill operated as a de facto director.

Both Stacks and Staffs were furniture retailers based in Stafford. Their businesses involved displaying and selling goods which continued to be owned by suppliers until it was sold to a customer; accordingly, the companies themselves owned no stock of any value. At any moment, their assets comprised, principally, any sums received from their customers. There was no significant difference between Stacks’ business and that of Staffs, which Mr Shergill and Miss Smith described as a “successor company”. The liquidators described Staffs more negatively, but just as accurately, as a “phoenix” company which continued its predecessor’s (Stacks’) failed business for a short time before its own failure.

The liquidators advanced several claims, including: (1) fraudulent trading against Mr Shergill under s. 213 IA, alleging that the companies’ businesses were carried on with intent to defraud creditors, in particular the Council and/or HMRC, and that Mr Shergill had knowingly participated in that conduct, (2) wrongful trading against both Mr Shergill and Miss Smith under s. 214 IA, claiming that from around late July 2018 both either knew or (in Miss Smith’s case) ought to have known, that there was no reasonable prospect of Staffs avoiding insolvent liquidation or administration, and that neither took appropriate steps to minimise losses to creditors, and (3) misfeasance / breach of duty against both Mr Shergill and Miss Smith.

In response to any claims based on breach of duty or trust, default and negligence, Mr Shergill and Miss Smith sought to rely on s. 1157 Companies Act 2006 (“CA”), which permits the Court to grant relief from liability where a person has acted reasonably and honestly, and ought fairly to be excused. Miss Smith, in particular, relied on the provision due to her relationship with Mr Shergill (with whom she has two children), and the circumstances of her appointment.

The First ICC Court Decision

Both of the liquidators’ claims succeeded. ICC Judge Greenwood found that Mr Shergill had carried out the businesses of the two companies with intent to defraud the Council and/or HMRC, acting with actual dishonesty and moral culpability. In reaching that conclusion, the Judge referred to: Mr Shergill’s extensive experience as a director; his involvement in multiple failed companies leaving unpaid “involuntary creditors”; and the absence of any realistic prospect that those liabilities would be met. In relation to the wrongful trading claim, the Judge found that Mr Shergill knew from at least late July 2018 that Staffs’ insolvent liquidation was inevitable, while Miss Smith was liable for the increase in net deficiency from that date until her resignation in October that year. Relief under s. 1157 CA was refused.

The misfeasance claims also succeeded, resulting in an order for Mr Shergill to pay all challenged payments and Miss Smith to pay those made during her period as director.

The Second ICC Court Decision

Following the first judgment, the liquidators obtained a monetary judgment (approx. £567,000) and an interim charging order over Mr Shergill’s property. However, before that charging order could be made final, Mr Shergill applied for bankruptcy, and a bankruptcy order was made against Mr Shergill.

In the second ICC Court proceeding, ICC Judge Burton exercised her discretion under section 346(6) IA and granted the liquidators’ application to reverse the effect of the bankruptcy order and to make the interim charging order final. She reasoned that the liquidators had established that Mr Shergill obtained the bankruptcy order to defeat the charging order. He knew of the interim charging order, and had applied for the bankruptcy order to defeat it, effectively using insolvency as a litigation tactic. The liquidators themselves had acted promptly in seeking relief under s. 346(6) IA, and importantly, they represented 96% of the value of Mr Shergill’s unsecured creditors and would likely have secured a final charging order had the bankruptcy order not been obtained.

Practical considerations

ICC Judge Burton emphasises that the Second ICC Court Decision is an “extraordinary case”, and that the courts will only exercise its discretion to make such orders in “exceptional circumstances”. Nonetheless, her decision demonstrates that the existence of a bankruptcy order does not always prevent the enforcement of a judgment, in particular where a party uses an application for their own bankruptcy order as a litigation tactic. These findings should be carefully considered both when (1) debtors intend to apply for their own bankruptcy orders, and (2) when faced with an opposing party’s bankruptcy order – when you should carefully consider the timing and reasons behind such order and whether it is being used as a litigation tactic.

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